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Criminal Procedure

witness testifies for the purpose of providing support. 3 The attendant
must not be (1) a member of the news or broadcast media, unless the
attendant is also the parent, child, brother or sister of the prosecuting
witness4 , or (2) a witness in the proceedings. 5
Under Chapter 369, an attendant who influences or affects the testimony of the prosecuting witness must be excluded by the court. 6 Additionally, a defendant may move to exclude a particular attendant on a
showing of good cause. 7 In apparent conflict with this provision, 8
Chapter 369 changes existing law9 by including attendants within the
class of persons absolutely protected from being excluded from hearings upon a motion by the defendant. 10
These conflicting provisions pertain to preliminary hearings or examinations only, while the provisions of Chapter 369, as they relate to
trials, are not in conflict. 11 Furthermore, the apparent intent of the legislature is that the general prohibition of existing law preventing the
exclusion of attendants should not be used to circumvent the more specific provision of Chapter 369 authorizing the exclusion of an attendant
for good cause. 12
3. /d.
4. /d. c. 369, §1(2), at 891. Chapter 369 prohibits attendants from taking notes during the
hearing or triaL/d.
5. /d. c. 369, §1(1), at 891.
6. /d. c. 369, §1(3), at 891. Chapter 369 also prohibits the attendant from attempting to
influence the witness' testimony. If an attendant is excluded for any reason, the prosecuting witness may designate another attendant./d. c. 369, §1(3),(4) at 891.
7. /d. c. 369, §1(4), at 891. The court must hear the defendant's motion out of the presence
of the jury, if any. /d.
8. Compare NEv. REv. STAT. §171.204 (amended by 1983 Nev. Stat. c. 369, §2, at 891) with
1983 Nev. Stat. c. 369, §1(4), at 891.
9. Compare NEv. REv. STAT. §171.204 (amended by 1983 Nev. Stat. c. 369, §2, at 891) with
1969 Nev. Stat. c. 364, §1, at 628-29 (amending NEV. REv. STAT. §171.204).
10. NEv. REv. STAT. §171.204 (amended by 1983 Nev. Stat. c. 369, §2, at 891).
ll. See 1983 Nev. Stat. c. 369, §l(l), at 891; see NEv. REv. STAT. §171.204 (amended by 1983
Nev. Stat. c. 369, §2, at 891); see also Telephone conversation with Mr. Lome Malkiewich, Legislative Counsel Bureau attorney (June 29, 1983) (notes on file at the Pactfic Law Journal) (hereinafter cited as Telephone conversation].
12. See Telephone conversation, supra note ll.

Criminal Procedure; witness immunity
NEv. REv. STAT. §178.572 (amended).

AB 246 (Committee on Judiciary); 1983 STAT. Ch 497
Under prior law, in any grand jury investigation, trial in a court of
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record, or trial in a justice's court, the court could order 1 a material
witness to be released from liability2 resulting from testimony or other
evidence that the witness was required to produce. 3 Chapter 497 provides this immunity only to witnesses called to testify at a grand jury
investigation, trial in a court of record, or preliminary examination. 4
I. 1967 Nev. Stat. c. 523, §373.2, at 1457 (enacting NEv. REv. STAT. §178.572). This order
requires a motion from the state requesting a release from liability. /d.
2. /d. (liability for prosecution or punishment).
3. /d.
4. NEV. REv. STAT. §178.572 (amended by 1983 Nev. Stat. c. 497, §I, at 1346).

Criminal Procedure; burglary-inferences
NEv. REv. STAT. §§205.060, 205.065, 205.2715, 205.312 (amended).
SB 315 (Committee on Judiciary); 1983 STAT. Ch 294
Existing law provides that a judge may not direct the jury to find a
presumed fact 1 against the accused in a criminal action. 2 When a presumed fact establishes guilt or is an element of the crime, the judge
may submit the issue of its existence to the jury only if a reasonable
juror could find the existence of the presumed fact beyond a reasonable
doubt, based upon evidence of the proven facts. 3
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 294, anyone breaking and entering4 or unlawfully entering a building was presumed to have the requisite intent to commit grand or petit larceny or a felony therein. 5 In
Hollis v. State ,6 however, the Nevada Supreme Court held that using
this identical language in a jury instruction7 violated the statutory prohibition8 against directing the jury to find a presumed fact. 9 Chapter
294 changes the definition of burglary by replacing the statutory preI. See Ex parte Kline, 71 Nev. 124, 134,282 P.2d 367,371 (1955)(a presumption is a deduction the law expressly directs to be made from particular facts); see also State v. Vaugham, 22 Nev.
285, 299, 39 P.2d. 733, 735 (1985)(a presumption is legitimate where a rational connection exists
between the facts proved and the facts assumed.); see NEv. REV. STAT., §47.230(l)(definition of
presumed fact).
2. NEv. REv. STAT. §47.230(2)(presumptions against accused in criminal actions); see also
Marshall v. State, 95 Nev. 802, 804, 603 P.2d 283, 284 (1979). The jury could be instructed to draw
an inference of guilty knowledge and intent, but could not be directed to do so. /d.
3. NEV. REV. STAT. §47.230(3).
4. /d. §193.010(3),(8) (definition of breaking; definition of entering).
5. 1959 Nev. Stat. c. 22, §I at 19 (amending NEv. REv. STAT. §205.065).
6. 96 Nev. 207, 606 P.2d 534 (1980).
7. /d. at 207, 606 P.2d at 535. The jury instruction in Hollis directed the jury to find criminal intent to commit larceny presumed from the proven facts. /d. The issue of intent was the only
disputed fact at trial. /d.
·
8. NEV. REV. STAT. §47.230(2).
9. Hollis 96 Nev. at 209, 606 P.2d at 535.
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